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I. INTRODUCTION 
Universities play a special role in the innovation ecosystem defined 
by federal funding agencies, state and federal government research, 
private industrial research and development, and intellectual property 
laws. Two overlapping and complementary questions define policy and 
doctrinal debates over the relationship between universities and 
innovation. First, how do we define the boundaries and scope of the 
university’s role in innovation? Second, once defined, will special rules 
for universities be required under intellectual property laws? 
This Article focuses on patent and copyright laws as applied to 
universities. Within existing statutes and as part of reform proposals, 
universities are sometimes given special treatment with respect to 
various dimensions of intellectual property.1 Ownership rules may be 
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tailored to the unique organizational form of universities, specifically in 
the various types of employees and the unique status of students, faculty, 
and staff. In turn, defenses such as experimental use and fair use may 
have unique applications that take into account the university’s status as 
a not-for-profit entity dedicated to education and research.2 Recent 
patent reform notably enacted tailored defenses of prior user rights 
because universities do not actively engage in the direct manufacture of 
technologies.3 Finally, in the ongoing debate over patent reform to 
address the problem of frivolous litigation by non-practicing entities 
(“NPE”), or trolls, there is a case for excluding universities from the 
NPE classification.4 These examples are the basis for the analytical 
section of this Article, assessing whether universities should be granted 
special treatment under patent and copyright laws. 
Past disputes can provide context for current debates. A search of 
intellectual property opinions involving universities uncovers the first 
published opinion regarding university intellectual property in 1930. 
Relevant cases from that year involved a trademark dispute over the 
term “University Clothes, Inc.”5 and a copyright dispute involving Yale 
University Press.6 The search uncovered over 700 reported opinions 
since 1930 involving intellectual property and universities. This body of 
opinions shows the increasing importance of intellectual property for 
universities. It also shows that the number of intellectual property 
opinions involving universities is small compared to the larger body of 
intellectual property disputes. 
Assessment of intellectual property rules for universities rests on 
understanding how they function as organizations. This inquiry is both 
positive and normative. For example, Peter Lee identifies two tendencies 
in the relationship between intellectual property and universities.7 One is 
that of academic exceptionalism, which exempts universities from many 
of the protocols and policies of intellectual property law. The other 
Syracuse University College of Law. BA, Amherst College; MA, PhD, University of Michigan 
Michigan; JD, Stanford Law School. This article was originally presented as a talk at the conference 
on universities held at the University of Akron School of Law, October, 2015. The author would 
like to thank Professors Jacqueline Lipton and Ryan Vacca for organizing the event. 
1. See, e.g., Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 64-75 (2013). 
2. See, e.g., id. at 25-26. 
3. See id. at 71-73. 
4. See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18  FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 612-13 (2008) (“Universities are non-practicing entities. They share some 
characteristics with trolls . . . but they are not.”) 
5. Panitz v. University Clothes, 40 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1930). 
6. Yale University Press v. Row, Peterson & Co., 40 F.2d 290 (S.D.N.Y 1930).
7. Lee, supra note 1. 
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tendency is one of internalization, as university culture becomes 
integrated into the commercial assumptions underlying intellectual 
property laws. Professor Lee reconciles these two tendencies by 
describing universities as entities imbued with a public purpose.8 This 
public purpose allows the universities to act within the world of 
intellectual property law with limits to include the public-minded ends of 
university management. 
The American university, however, has undergone many challenges 
as the organization navigates the pulls of commercialization and the 
demands of the many constituencies it serves.9 At any point in time, a 
university may be serving many goals, some purely private and some 
purely public.10 As universities seek revenue sources from athletics, 
teaching, and research, they act not all that differently from for-profit 
corporations. At the same time, as universities seek to diversify faculty 
and the student body and serve the needs of local communities, they act 
like charitable organizations. Aggregating the various pulls on 
universities into one criterion such as public purpose is difficult, if not 
impossible. Instead universities are multivalent, and managed along 
multiple criteria. This is the principal theme of this Article. 
Interactions between private interests and public rights within 
universities dictate how researchers and scientists negotiate the need for 
practical, industrial application and pure, scientific knowledge.11 
Intellectual property law and policy creates special rules based on the 
complex dynamic between universities and innovation, and it should 
continue to do so as universities shift between models of pure research 
and pure commercialization. The special rules for universities represent 
legislative compromises that rest in part on an idealized view of 
universities and on the real politics of law-making in a world of 
university-industry collaboration.12 This Article presents a multivalent 
model that offers a positive account of university governance, which can 
guide intellectual property policy as set forth in both legislation and in 
8. Id. at 75-76. 
9. See LAURENCE R. VEYSEY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 252 (1965)
(tracking the development of the university’s role from that of providing religious education to that 
of pure research within a liberal culture). 
10. Id. at 346-48 (setting forth various business models for universities).
11. See STEVEN SHAPIN, NEVER PURE: HISTORICAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE AS IF IT WAS 
PRODUCED BY PEOPLE WITH BODIES, SITUATED IN TIME, SPACE, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY, AND 
STRUGGLING FOR CREDIBILITY AND AUTHORITY 213-14 (2010) (analyzing the dilemma facing the 
industrial scientist navigating the tensions between the culture of universities and that of industry). 
12. See, e.g., WENDY SCHACHT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE UNITED
STATES, RL32076, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: SELECTED ISSUES IN PATENT POLICY AND THE 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY 4 (2006). 
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university administration. 
What distinguishes this Article is its focus on the university as an 
organization. While a university is an institution embodying specific 
values of a community (whether local, national, or global), a university 
is a collection of individuals coming together to interact in a community. 
As an organization, a university has to choose its governance structure, 
including its management of intellectual property rights and the 
attendant relationships among researchers, teachers, students, and 
administrators.13 When I ask whether a university pursues pure research, 
pure commercialization, or a mix, I am asking a question about how a 
university is organized. It is the focus on the university’s organization 
that distinguishes the approach of this Article from other scholarly work. 
Answering the question of whether universities are special requires 
delving into the purpose of universities, particularly in the broader 
innovation ecosystem. Part II of this Article presents three specific 
models of the university, which address these bigger questions stated 
above. These specific models are meant to be both descriptive and 
normative and serve as a benchmark for assessing the contributions of 
universities to innovation. As one application of these three models, I 
look at the specific case of university athletics. This example introduces 
many of the analytic issues pertinent to understanding the role of the 
university in innovation. Part III presents the special rules arising in 
intellectual property laws for the treatment of universities. The models 
presented in Part II provide a foundation for assessing these special rules 
normatively for intellectual property policy. Part IV concludes by stating 
that universities are special and recognizes that organizational choice 
plays a critical role in federal and state policies for invention, 
innovation, and development of intellectual property. My bottom line is 
that the special rules represent legislative compromises that rest in part 
on an idealized view of universities and on the real politics of law 
making in a world of university-industry collaboration. 
II. ROLES OF THE UNIVERSITY
Universities are seemingly timeless institutions, serving as 
sanctuaries for those who want to engage in ideas, learning, and cultural 
milestones for personal development. Perhaps Plato’s Academy is the 
13. See, e.g., MAKERERE UNIVERSITY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT POLICY
(March 13, 2008) (on file with author) (setting forth intellectual property and governance rules in a 
university in Uganda and illustrating the importance of organization rules for universities in 
developing countries). 
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earliest example of a university offering an informal venue for dialogue, 
unfettered by curricula and driven solely by wide ranging inquiry.14 
Nalanda University in Bihar, India, University of Bologna, Oxford, and 
Cambridge are the old-world models, offering more structure than the 
Academy but serving a similar role as haven for the inquisitive and 
contemplative.15 
The modern university is associated with the United States, but 
U.S. universities take many forms. Established and elite universities like 
Harvard and Yale were founded for the moral education of men and to 
instill spiritual values associated with good citizenship and 
participation.16 This model was transmitted throughout the Colonies, and 
the tradition continues through today, even if the spiritual virtues have 
taken on a more professional dimension targeted towards the 
development of a managerial class. Land grant universities were a 
government venture aimed at turning newly acquired territories into 
institutions providing practical training for citizens of the newly 
recognized states.17 Practical, at the time, had a broad meaning going 
beyond narrow job training to include problem solving and engagement 
with the broader population. For land grants, the sanctuary of the 
university served a public purpose. Add to these two models the 
technical colleges, the technical institutes, community colleges, and city 
universities, and we obtain a rich picture of universities as institutions: 
establishments that were vital and critical for the functioning of the 
country with a range of options for those who sought civic engagement 
or introspection. 
German universities enter into our understanding of university 
models in part through their influence on the organization of university 
administration.18 Bureaucratization and the development of departments 
opened the way for governance within the university, permitting the 
offering of greater services and options for its constituencies, primarily 
students. German universities were the models for elite U.S. universities 
in the late nineteenth century, providing a rigorous theoretical training 
14. See Thomas J. Siepmann, The Global Exportation of the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act, 30 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 209, 213 n. 15 (2004); Edward J. Conry & Caryn L. Beck-Dudley, Meta-
Jurisprudence: A Paradigm for Legal Studies, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 691, 735 (1996). 
15. See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Garten, Really Old School Higher Education in Asia, INT’L HERALD
TRIB. (Dec. 11, 2006), 2006 WLNR 21360007 (describing Nalanda University as one of the first 
great universities that died a slow death around the time the great European universities, including 
Oxford and University of Bologna, were getting started). 
16. See VEYSEY, supra note 9, at 32-33. 
17. Id. at 70-71. 
18. Id. at 128-29. 
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that rose above technical schools.19 Particularly, elite law schools were 
fashioned in the manner of German universities providing doctrinal 
training within scientific traditions.20 
After World War II, as the centers for university excellence shifted 
to England and the United States and away from devastated Germany, 
new visions of the university came to the fore in the United States.21 The 
mega-university took the bureaucratized university to new heights, 
serving large populations of students and providing secure positions for 
academics and staff. Scientific research and development became the 
foundation for innovation policy as federal policymakers focused on 
ways to avoid the catastrophic downturn of the Great Depression. 
Federal agencies would provide funding for university researchers who 
would in turn generate new ideas, new products, and new inventions to 
feed industry.22 Even if universities would not commercialize products, 
they would provide the resources, the seed capital from the intellect, for 
commercialization that would invariably feed the American consumer. 
But this scheme did not rule out the possibility of new companies and 
industries springing forth from within the university. However, there 
was a sense that the business of universities was not business, even if 
universities would sometimes be in close partnership with 
entrepreneurs.23 
Against this historical background, we can identify three models for 
the contemporary university, particularly as we understand its 
relationship to intellectual property. The first is the model of the 
university as the producer of pure research, which is discussed in Part 
II.A. The second is the model of the university as a commercial entity
with a public purpose, which is discussed in Part II.B. The third and final 
model, discussed in Part II.C, is the model of the university as a pure 
commercial entity, no different from a for-profit corporation. Let us 
examine each model in turn and assess its implications. The analysis will 
set the foundation for our understanding of specific patent and copyright 
doctrines as applied to universities. 
A. Universities as Pure Research Entities 
One idealized view of the university is as a producer of pure 
19. See Mark Bartholomew, Legal Separation: The Relationship Between the Law School
and the Central University in the Late Nineteenth Century, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 368, 377-78 (2003). 
20. See id. at 378-79. 
21. See VEYSEY, supra note 9, at 312-13. 
22. See, e.g., SCHACHT, supra note 12, at 5. 
23. See, e.g., id. 
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research24 with its core constituencies, faculty, and students pursuing 
questions independent of commercial or financial concerns. It would be 
hard to deny the inherent value of free and open inquiry, untethered from 
concerns of profit and internal rates of return. The interesting question is 
to what extent can universities match this ideal in practice? Resource 
constraints and scarcity of time and money may limit how far faculty 
and students can thrive in a rarified environment of free wielding 
inquiry, guided solely by the rigors of particular disciplines. 
Santiniketan, the lovely rural university created by Bengali poet and 
novelist Rabindranath Tagore, is the closest I have seen to such a utopia. 
Liberal arts colleges, tucked away in United States hinterlands, 
sometimes emanate pure intellectual pleasure and engagement even if 
marred by pressures of upward mobility and maintenance of social 
standing. St. John’s University, with its Santa Fe and Annapolis 
campuses, requires commitment to a four-year, great-books program that 
immerses students in the development of Western Civilization.25 If one 
were to construct a world from nothing, the need for some institution 
that allows for unadulterated thinking would be readily apparent; that 
institution would have many of the characteristics of actual universities. 
While the temptation to exult pure research may stem from the 
desire to seek knowledge for knowledge’s sake, there is a practical 
reason to focus on pure research. Concentration on fundamental 
questions allows disciplines to flourish and evolve. This is true whether 
that discipline is in the natural sciences, the search for understanding the 
work in which we live; in the humanities, the search for how thinking 
and emotions evolve in the individual personality; or in social cultures, 
with its dimensions of language, history, arts, and religion. This practical 
turn does not tarnish the purist model of the university. Human inquiry is 
not solely about having one’s heads in the clouds, but also about being 
aware of the ground one walks upon. Pure research, to put it bluntly, can 
be both theoretical and applied. 
Where the purist model starts to tarnish is through considerations of 
finance. To live the life of pure research requires resources. Some 
institutions, like Santiniketan, may have the benefit of healthy 
endowments, but such endowments have to be maintained, leading to 
dull, practical questions of where to invest, how much to invest, and 
24. I do not mean to exclude teaching from the mission of the university by using the word
“research.” I am using that word expansively to include inquiry, and teaching would be part of the 
broader meaning. 
25. Academic Programs, ST. JOHN’S COLLEGE, http://www.sjc.edu/academic-
programs/undergraduate/liberal-arts/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2016). 
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where to place the returns. Institutions without endowments have more 
basic questions to ask about sources of money to run a going concern.26 
Practical research may readily become one revenue stream, requiring 
engagement with the world of commerce. Once that happens, the luster 
of the pure research model fades, and the choice has to be made whether 
the university becomes a profit center or continues with its idealized 
mission. The second model suggests a way that the institution can 
accomplish both. 
B. Universities as Commercial Entities with Public Purpose 
A second idealized view permits universities pursuing commercial 
ends but for a public purpose, which can be construed in many ways. As 
mentioned at the end of the previous section, the dual-purpose university 
satisfies both the need for profit and the pursuit of pure ideas. A 
university can be run as a business through the identification of revenue 
streams. These streams can include the commercialization of products 
and services developed within the university such as courses, patentable 
inventions, copyrightable content, and branded merchandise.27 But what 
keeps the university from turning into an amusement park or a cruise 
ship on land is the demand of channeling profits towards public goals. 
The most likely candidate for these public goals would be the pursuit of 
pure research. However, like running water, currency can move towards 
many destinations, and the ocean of pure knowledge may be only one. 
As nonprofit organizations, universities need to put their profits back 
into the organization rather than making a payout to residual claimants, 
whether shareholders, partners, or members. By putting profits back into 
the organization, a university uses commercialization presumably to 
finance its public purposes. 
The challenge for this model is the implication for the organization 
of for-profit universities. There is nothing within the model that rules out 
the possibility of for-profit universities so long as the entity uses its 
profits for public purposes. Defining these public purposes for a for-
profit university is the difficult issue. Public purposes might include 
scholarships for students, research support for faculty, or funding for 
local community projects. But public purpose might also include 
26. See, e.g., Sarah E. Waldeck, The Coming Showdown Over University Endowments:
Enlisting the Donors, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1795, 1800 (2009) (“Because the magnitude of activity 
is smaller at a liberal arts college, it needs fewer resources than a large research university.”). 
27. See, e.g., Elizabeth Townsend, Legal and Policy Responses to the Disappearing
“Teacher Exception” or Copyright Ownership in the 21st Century, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 
209, 220 (2003). 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss3/3
2016] ARE UNIVERSITIES SPECIAL? 679 
international programs and other initiatives that extend beyond the 
traditional domain of the university. Conceptually, public purpose entails 
redefining the residual claimants of the surplus from a for-profit 
university to include a broader class of beneficiaries in the community. 
Doctrinally, the for-profit university could best be understood as a type 
of benefit corporation with the beneficiaries being defined by the 
founders and set forth in the corporate documents. 
One concern with the public purpose model is that the definition of 
public purpose can expand to include interests that might seem more 
akin to private ones. For example, public benefits may align with private 
interests of founders or professors, such as the local symphony or 
regional art museum or with political causes and campaigns. 
Furthermore, the commercial goals of universities to accumulate 
financial surpluses might lead the university to focus solely on 
commercialization efforts, losing sight of any broader public benefit, 
however altruistically set forth in the founding documents. A cynic 
might say that universities inevitably collapse into the model of pure 
commercial activity, no different from other for-profit business 
organizations. But even without accepting that cynical position, a realist 
might still predict the inevitable collapse of the pure or modified models 
into the third model described in the next section. 
C. Universities as Pure Commercial Entities 
The third idealized view of the university is as a pure commercial 
entity no different from a for-profit corporation. To call this model 
idealized may seem misguided as reducing a university to the status of 
any other business entity eviscerates the institution of any noble ideals of 
learning and research. But the university as a locus of pure self-interest 
is idealized in the sense of serving as a rarified model for the purposes of 
analysis, a benchmark against which to gauge policy choices. This 
model is also idealized in the sense that it is wholly unrealistic, ignoring 
not only important virtues but also practical details of the university 
mission. 
Among some, there may be superficial appeal in treating 
universities like any other business entity, driven by the profit motive 
and the necessity of meeting payroll. An implication of this conception 
of the universities is that they should be left to fail, no matter how big 
they are, if they cannot produce certain measures of success, whether 
they be profits, graduates, or research. For those familiar with post-
Thatcher academia, this picture should be familiar as British universities 
9
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and academies are subject to unavoidable scrutiny of university outputs. 
With the example of contemporary British universities, it seems that this 
model is not pure fantasy and is one that seems to have been adopted. 
Should this model be ruled out on its face? Faithful adherents to the 
pure research model might say yes. I may be one of these adherents, but 
am also willing to play the advocate here of the pure commercialization 
model. The defense would work as follows. Organizational success is 
important for society. One measure of success is survival in a 
competitive environment. Organizations that survive a competitive 
environment have characteristics of efficiency in delivering outputs that 
society finds desirable. Therefore, universities need to demonstrate their 
success by thriving in a competitive environment just like any other 
entity in order to benefit society. 
The healthy competition argument ignores the many ways in which 
competition might be destructive. First, education and research generate 
positive externalities or benefits that cannot be fully captured through 
market competition. As a result, too little education will be provided and 
too little research will result if solely competitive forces determined 
outcomes. Second, the creation of universities requires large initial, or 
fixed, costs. These large fixed costs require some degree of scale of 
production in the marketplace for entities to be profitable. Competitive 
forces acting alone can make it difficult, if not impossible, for entities to 
generate scale in production. As a result, competitive forces may tend to 
drive out most universities that fail to reach a size that would be more 
conducive to success. While scale effects and externalities may arise in 
many industries, the two together make competitive forces unhealthy 
and even unworkable in producing viable, socially desirable universities. 
In addition, there are potential problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection in university markets. For example, education requires 
initial investments by students who defer present compensation for 
future earnings. Universities capitalize on these investments by 
accepting tuition payments currently with the expectation of returns to 
the training and education presented in the classroom. But once 
universities receive these tuition payments, there is an incentive not to 
fulfill the promise of training, especially if the educational inputs are 
uncertain or hard to completely measure. Therefore, universities might 
shirk in providing training (moral hazard), and bad universities might 
drive out good ones (adverse selection). 
These limitations show that universities may be subject to 
regulation in order to deal with the infirmities of market transactions. 
This conclusion does not deny the validity of the pure commercialization 
10
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model. It simply states that universities would need to be regulated in 
similar ways as other entities that produce positive externalities, incur 
high fixed costs, and are subject to moral hazard and adverse selection. 
The form of those regulations would depend upon characteristics of the 
industry, paying particular attention to the geographic scope of the 
market (regional versus national), the distribution channels in the 
marketplace, allocation of information among buyers and sellers, 
organizational forms, and other factors. 
D. No One Stable Model: How the Three Models Interact 
In constructing the governance and regulation of universities, the 
specific details of social interactions among faculty, students, staff, and 
administrators would guide how regulation is designed and what 
transactions are the target of oversight. But in the course of assessing 
these social interactions, a regulator would come across the practical 
details of university life. Students need housing, access to books, and 
support in the education process. Faculty need resources to pursue 
teaching and research and tools for governance in interactions with 
students and with each other. Regulation comes up against these social 
interactions and the cultural values of education and scholarship. 
Universities, no matter the depth of commitment to commercialization, 
are political and social institutions, little communities, and sometimes 
little cities. Therefore, public mindedness and civic virtue must come 
into play for university governance. In this way, our three models may 
converge, or at least blur. Just as material necessity leads the pure 
research model towards the forces of commercialization, the attention to 
markets and competition leads to the need for social and cultural norms 
that allow universities to cohere into the locus of governance and 
regulation. 
University athletics provides one example of how these three 
models apply to ongoing and compelling policy debates. How should 
athletics be regulated? Should athletics serve as a basis for 
commercialization or should they be seen as purely intramural? Answers 
will rest on how one conceives of the university. 
The pure research model, in its extreme form, may support 
skepticism of athletics, especially in the all-consuming form. But those 
who favor the pure research model because of its appeal to the human 
mind would recognize the need for a healthy body to nourish mental 
activities. Therefore, college athletics can serve to support pure research 
through distraction, entertainment, and exercise. Furthermore, there 
11
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might be a limited practical and commercial benefit from investment in 
athletics. So athletics can flourish even within the pure research 
university but as a secondary venture that must yield when research is 
threatened. 
For the university engaging in public minded commercialization, 
athletics has a role not only as a source of revenue but also as a basis for 
public engagement in competition and team spiritedness.28 However, 
university commitment to athletics may come at the expense of the 
public interest. Town-gown relations may lead to tensions between 
privileged athletes and targets of abuse in the local community. Within 
the university campus, the special status of the college athlete may create 
divisions among students, and cause rifts between students and faculty 
who face pressures from athletic departments. Furthermore, an 
overemphasis on athletics may undermine public values of education 
and research as attention is distracted from the classroom to the 
gridiron.29 
Athletics may be the lodestone for the purely commercially-minded 
university. Merchandising, television rights, ticket sales—each serve as 
just one source of many for the generation of revenue. The returns for 
investing in athletics can, in turn, finance research and educational 
efforts, at least for the successful, large-scale universities. But the 
market for college athletics will undoubtedly need regulation as students 
can be the victims of exploitation, and competition over intangible 
reputation and prizes can distort incentives in a winner take all market.30 
Some of these regulations will overlap with the concerns raised in the 
pure research model and in the commercialization with public purpose 
model. Nevertheless, if we allow universities to wholly focus on 
commercialization, to operate like any other firm, a heavy focus on 
athletics may require more regulation to address university battles over 
revenue streams and intellectual property rights within and across the 
university. 
The example of athletics demonstrates how the three models would 
apply to the issue of intellectual property doctrine and the question 
posed in the title of this Article. The pure research and 
commercialization with public purpose models would support special 
rules for universities to potentially limit the adverse roles of patent and 
28. See, e.g., CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, BIG-TIME SPORTS IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES 95-
96 (2011). 
29. See Matthew J. Mitten, James L. Musselman, & Bruce W. Burton, Targeted Reform of
Commercialized Intercollegiate Athletics, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779, 818, 837 (2010). 
30. See id. at 781. 
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copyright for the goals of universities. A pure commercialization model 
might support a more expansive role for copyright and patent. But, as the 
discussion in this section also shows, these models may have 
overlapping application. Consequently, actual rules for universities 
within copyright and patent illustrate different applications of these 
models, emphasizing some goals and downplaying others, depending 
upon the context. To discern these conflicting visions of the university in 
patent and copyright, we turn in the next section to specific doctrinal 
applications. 
III. UNIVERSITIES AS OWNERS, USERS, AND ENFORCERS
How does the dynamic of the three models of the university inform 
intellectual property policy towards universities? This section examines 
that question with particular attention to the issues of ownership in Part 
III.A, infringement in Part III.B, and enforcement in Part III.C.
A. Universities as Owners of Patents and Copyrights 
Ownership rules for intellectual property would seemingly be 
neutral between universities and other entities. Patent rights are initially 
allocated to the natural person who invents the patented subject matter. 
Whether that natural person invents within a university or a for-profit 
context is irrelevant for the basic rule of patent ownership.31 Similarly, 
trademarks are owned by the user of the trademark to brand an 
association in consumers’ minds between a product or service and the 
mark serving as an indicator of source. If a university creates and uses a 
trademark to brand its services and products, the university owns the 
trademark. Finally, work made for hire under copyright law applies 
equally to employees and contractors within universities and those 
within for-profit entities.32 Therefore, the university can be deemed the 
author and copyright owner of works created by their employees, 
whether faculty, staff, or students.33 In this section, the focus will be on 
patent and copyright ownership rules for universities. 
Before the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, recipients of federal 
research funding and sponsored research grants could not have an 
31. See Lee, supra note 1, at 60. 
32. See Michele J. Le Moal-Gray, Distance Education and Intellectual Property: The
Realties of Copyright Law and the Culture of Higher Education, 16 TOURO L. REV. 981, 991-92 
(2000). 
33. See id. at 993. 
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ownership interest in patents.34 This restriction applied to researchers 
who received the funding, as well as their employers.35 The limitation on 
patent ownership applied to all entities, including universities, for-profit 
corporations, and non-profit stand-alone research institutes.36 In practice, 
however, universities and research institutes were the principal 
recipients of research grants. Effectively, at one point in time in the 
history of U.S. patent law, there were separate rules of patent ownership 
for universities. The rationale for not allowing recipients of federal 
funding to own patents was one of avoiding double taxation of the 
public, who would pay once for the federal funding and would pay again 
in purchasing potentially higher priced patented products that resulted 
from the funding. 
The Bayh-Dole Act removed this prohibition against patent 
ownership by allowing recipients of federal funds and sponsored grants 
to patent inventions that were the result of the funded research and 
development.37 Double taxation was not seen as a bar because, absent 
the patent, an innovative product might not even make it to market. 
Therefore, the taxpayer would be paying first for the invention of the 
new technology and second for its commercialization. Patents were seen 
as underwriting the innovation process while the research funding 
stimulated invention and discovery. An open question under the Bayh-
Dole Act, however, is who owned the invention that was the fruit of 
university research. Commentators, as well as representatives of 
universities, read the Bayh-Dole Act as giving the contractor an 
ownership interest in the patent as the recipient of the funds.38 Under this 
interpretation, the university would automatically own patented 
inventions created by an employee. On the other hand, advocates for 
inventors argue that the Bayh-Dole Act did not alter the basic patent rule 
that inventors owned their inventions and were initially allocated patent 
rights.39 The United States Supreme Court resolved this issue in its 2011 
Stanford v. Roche decision.40 
34. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents
and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996). 
35. See SCHACHT, supra note 12, at 2. 
36. See id. 
37. See id. at 1. 
38. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 1, at 31. 
39. See Maddy F. Baer, Stephanie Lollo Donahue, & Rebecca J. Cantor, Stanford v. Roche: 
Confirming the Basic Patent Law Principle that Inventors Ultimately Have Rights in Their 
Inventions, 47 LES NOUVELLES 19, 23 (2012). 
40. Bd. of Trs. of the Leeland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S.Ct.
2188 (2011). 
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss3/3
2016] ARE UNIVERSITIES SPECIAL? 685 
The facts of the Stanford case are as follows. As part of a federal 
grant obtained from the National Institute of Health, Stanford University 
hired a research scientist, Dr. Mark Holodniy, to investigate the 
diagnosis and treatment of HIV.41 Dr. Holodniy signed a promise to 
assign future patent rights to Stanford.42 On a research leave from 
Stanford, the scientist visited Cetus where he learned PCR techniques to 
sequence genes.43 As a visitor, he signed an assignment agreeing to 
assign future patent rights to Cetus.44 Holodniy obtained a patent, which 
was assigned to Stanford.45 In the meantime, Roche acquired Cetus who, 
under the terms of the assignment agreement from Holodniy, began to 
use the technology notwithstanding the fact that the patents were 
assigned to Stanford.46 Stanford sued for patent infringement, and Roche 
raised the defense that Stanford had no patent rights.47 The district court 
found for Stanford, basing its decision on the Bayh-Dole Act, which 
allegedly assigned priority of rights to Stanford, the recipient of the 
federal funds.48 The Federal Circuit reversed, reasoning that Stanford did 
not have rights under the Bayh-Dole Act and, in fact, had rights 
subordinate to those of Roche.49 The conclusion rested on the wording 
of the assignments. Cetus’s assignment agreement stated that Holodniy 
“hereby” assigned its future patent rights to Cetus.50 This language was 
construed as a present assignment to the company. On the other hand, 
the assignment to Stanford did not contain this language.51 Therefore, 
even though Stanford’s assignment was first in time to be entered into, 
the rights conferred onto the university were a future promise to assign 
future rights. Consequently, Roche obtained the future patent rights at 
the time the assignment was executed, and therefore acquired the patent 
rights before Stanford. The university appealed to the Supreme Court on 
the question of rights under the Bayh-Dole Act.52 Whether the Federal 
Circuit correctly interpreted the assignments was not raised in the 
41. Id. at 2192. 
42. Id.
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 2193. 
48. Id. at 2194. 
49. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d
832, 836-37, (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
50. Id. at 842. 
51. See id. at 841-42. 
52. Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2195. 
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petition for certiorari.53 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit on the Bayh-Dole 
issue.54 Justice Roberts’ majority opinion starts from the fundamental 
principle that the inventor is the initial owner of patent rights.55 Nothing 
in the language of the Bayh-Dole Act, he wrote, changed that basic 
rule.56 The Act was permissive, altering the previous rule against patent 
ownership by recipients of federal funding. Under the Act’s terms, the 
recipient is allowed to own a patent. However, the Act does not grant the 
recipient rights in the patent automatically. Instead, patent rights have to 
be transferred through an assignment or a license, as with any other 
entity. Justice Breyer, in his dissent joined by Justice Ginsburg, would 
read the Bayh-Dole Act as giving the contractor with the funding 
agency, namely the university, outright ownership in any patents that 
stem from the funded research.57 According to the dissent, the Bayh-
Dole Act creates a three-tiered system of ownership with patent rights 
first going to the university, then to the government, and finally to the 
inventor, absent agreements to the contrary.58 By contrast, Justice 
Roberts emphasized common law rules of ownership, which he reasoned 
were not modified or abrogated by the Act.59 
University ownership of patents provides an insightful example for 
assessing the special treatment of universities. Under the ruling in 
Stanford v. Roche, universities do not get special treatment for patent 
ownership because they are the recipients of federal research funds.60 
Justice Roberts’ reasoning supports the conclusion that universities are 
just like any other entity and therefore subject to the same common law 
rules of ownership. This conclusion may be based on an implicit 
adoption of the third model, described in the previous section, of treating 
universities just like any other commercial entity. While that may be the 
effect of the ownership rules, the Court’s rationale may have more to do 
with the recognition of inventors’ rights and the importance of clear 
abrogation of common law rules by the legislature. The rationale seems 
to be one of correct incentives for invention rather than the proper role 
of the university, even if the effect is to put universities on the same 
level as commercial entities. 
53. Id. at 2194 n. 2. 
54. Id. at 2199. 
55. See SCHACHT, supra note 12, at 3. 
56. Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2199. 
57. See id. at 2203-04 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
58. Id. at 2200. 
59. Id. at 2194-95 (majority opinion). 
60. Id. at 2197.
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As a final note, it is useful to compare the treatment of ownership 
under the Bayh-Dole Act with work made for hire. Under the latter 
doctrine, the university would hold the initial entitlement in copyright 
for works created by its employees.61 Ostensibly, universities are treated 
like other commercial entities for the purposes of copyright ownership.62 
But the rule itself may incorporate differing employment relationships 
across differing entities. Within universities, university ownership may 
depend on internal rules defining how various constituents, students, and 
faculty and staff, are treated for employment purposes. Furthermore, the 
teacher exception, recognized in several states, excludes copyrighted 
teaching materials from the work made for hire rules.63  This exception 
allows teachers to retain copyright ownership in their teaching materials 
even if they are deemed to be employees of the university. 
On the surface, ownership rules for patent and copyright suggest a 
coequal treatment of universities and commercial entities. But because 
of the special circumstances and rules surrounding universities, the equal 
application of ownership rules allows for university ownership to serve a 
public interest consistent with the second model describing the status of 
universities. This public interest can be pursued by specific rules for 
defining employee status and through exceptions such as that for 
teaching materials. 
B. Universities as Infringers and the Experimental Use Defense 
Experimental use is a defense to patent infringement, which was 
narrowed by the Federal Circuit in its Madey v. Duke University 
decision.64 This defense is analogous to the reverse engineering defense 
under trade secret law and the narrow protection for reverse engineering 
under copyright fair use. All three doctrines recognize to various degrees 
the value of experimentation, research, and study in the creative process. 
In the case of copyright, fair use protects from claims of infringement 
follow-on creation that facilitates compatibility and interoperability of 
conflicting software based systems, such as with videogames.65 In the 
61. See Michele J. Le Moal-Gray, supra note 32, at 991-93. 
62. See, e.g., JACOB H. ROOKSBY, THE BRANDING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: HOW 
UNIVERSITIES CAPTURE, MANAGE, AND MONETIZE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND WHY IT 
MATTERS (forthcoming 2016). 
63. See Eric Priest, Copyright and the Harvard Open Access Mandate, 10 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 377, 403-06 (2012). 
64. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
65. See e.g., Karen E. Georgenson, Comment, Reverse Engineering of Copyrighted Software: 
Fair Use or Misuse?, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 291, 294-308 (1996). 
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case of trade secrets, reverse engineering permits experimentation to 
uncover knowledge that is secreted away by a company.66 Experimental 
use, in contrast, is narrower in permitting through its common law form 
philosophical inquiry and speculation, but not uses that are motivated by 
commercialization.67 
The different treatments of experimentation reflect the different 
balances of ownership and use under each area of the law. For copyright, 
reverse engineering as fair use reflects the intermingling of 
uncopyrightable processes and copyrightable software in videogames. 
For trade secrets, reverse engineering sheds sunlight on the opaqueness 
of trade secret law. Experimental use under patent law is narrow because 
the patent document discloses the invention that anyone can read even if 
use of the invention is prohibited. In order to discover the trade secret, 
one is allowed to study and take apart the product or process protected 
by secrecy.68 Patent law does not permit experimentation more broadly 
because the document reveals the invention. 
This narrow conception of experimental use under patent law 
follows from the Federal Circuit’s decision in Madey, an opinion based 
on a provocative view of the university. Madey, an acclaimed scientist in 
the field of lasers, left Stanford University to join the faculty of Duke 
University.69 One of the attractions in joining Duke was the promise of 
new lab facilities to house Madey’s patented laser gun.70 When Madey 
left Duke, he left for a time his patented laser in his former lab.71 
Researchers at Duke used the laser without his permission, and Madey 
sued for patent infringement.72 Duke University unsuccessfully raised 
the experimental defense, pointing to its pure academic purposes in 
using the patented tool.73 The Federal Circuit rejected the defense 
because Duke had a commercial interest in its experiments, even if only 
indirect.74 Experiments could lead to research funding, which could lead 
to greater research and development that would be the basis for further 
patents and commercial ventures. The court’s reasoning reduces most, if 
66. See generally Daniel Laster, The Secret is Out: Patent Law Preempts Mass Market
License Terms Barring Reverse Engineering for Interoperability Purposes, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 
621, 639-40 (2006). 
67. See Lee, supra note 1, at 25. 
68. Laster, supra note 66, at 640. 
69. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1352. 
70. See id. 
71. See id. at 1353. 
72. Id. 
73. See id. at 1356, 1360. 
74. Id. at 1361-63. 
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not all, university activity to being commercial in nature. As a result, the 
experimental use was found not to apply.75 
Arguably, Duke tried to expand the experimental use defense to 
cover all activities by researchers in universities. The University in 
effect was asserting a special rule excepting universities from patent 
infringement under the experiment use defense. The Federal Circuit 
rejected this expansionist view by offering a contrary expansionist 
position.76 The court’s opinion is a broad one, strongly implying that 
universities are no different from other commercial entities. The Madey 
opinion represents the third model of universities, described above. Pure 
research, under the court’s reasoning, would not be possible in a 
university; all paths lead to commercialization.77 Public purpose also 
seems elusive for a university if one accepts the Federal Circuit’s views. 
It is very difficult to distinguish between a university and a commercial, 
for-profit entity. Although this equation may apply only to the 
experimental use defense, the Federal Circuit’s view of the research 
university would imply that there are no special rules for universities 
under intellectual property law. 
Prior user rights were expanded under the America Invents Act 
beyond the narrow confines of business method patents introduced in 
1999 amendments to the Patent Act of 1952.78 If the Federal Circuit’s 
Madey opinion would suggest no special rules for universities, 
Congress’ treatment of prior user rights demonstrates the need for 
special rules in certain circumstances. Comparing the different 
approaches of the Federal Circuit and Congress to universities shows 
contrasting institutional perspectives as well as the role of university-
based interest group politics in the passage of patent legislation. 
Under the America Invents Act (AIA), which added § 273 of the 
Patent Act, prior user rights apply to a person who “acting in good faith, 
commercially used the subject matter in the United States, either in 
connection with an internal commercial use or an actual arm’s length 
sale or other arm’s length commercial transfer of a useful end result of 
such commercial use.”79 This commercial use must occur within one 
year of either one of two effective dates set forth in the statute.80 
75. Id. at 1364. 
76. See id. at 1360-63. 
77. See id. at 1362-63. 
78. 35 U.S.C § 273 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-115 (excluding 114-94 and 114-95) 
2015). 
79.  § 273(a)(1). 
80.  § 273(a)(2). 
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The provision expands the definition of commercial use and the 
applicability of the defense to include universities. Specifically, the 
section provides: “A use of subject matter by a nonprofit research 
laboratory or other nonprofit entity, such as a university or hospital, for 
which the public is the intended beneficiary, shall be deemed to be a 
commercial use . . . except that a defense under this section may be 
asserted pursuant to this paragraph only for continued and 
noncommercial use by and in the laboratory or other nonprofit entity.”81 
The expansive definition of “commercial use” might suggest that 
the philosophy underlying the AIA is one that places universities as 
equivalent to other commercial entities. But that conclusion would 
ignore the linguistic trick that is at the heart of the prior use defense. By 
limiting the scope of patent infringement, the prior use defense protects 
consumers and marketplace competition by exempting an entity that has 
made prior commercial use of a patented invention before certain critical 
dates relevant to the patenting process. Effectively, these prior 
commercial uses are placed in the prior art not to invalidate the patent in 
question, but to narrow its reach. However, by extending the protection 
only to prior commercial users, the AIA offers no protection to prior 
users who are non-commercial.82 One could argue that patent owners 
would have less incentive to pursue non-commercial prior users because 
there would be limited damages to recover, notwithstanding the 
possibility of an injunction against these prior users. If universities are 
left exposed to patent liability when they would otherwise qualify as 
prior users, the expansive definition equalizes the treatment of 
universities and commercial prior users. Therefore, the definition of 
commercial use implicitly recognizes the difference between universities 
and commercial entities. 
What is the difference? Does the recognized difference support 
either of the alternative models for treatment of universities? Arguably 
either model one or model two can explain the difference implicit in the 
text of the prior use defense. Folding university research use into 
commercial use would suggest the university as a locus of pure research, 
where even activities that could lead to patenting are pursued for the 
goals of pure research. Furthermore, the need to include university 
research within commercial use could reflect a broader public purpose 
for university activity that requires shelter from the specter of patent 
infringement. While that purpose may go undefined, the drafters of the 
81.  § 273(c)(2). 
82. See § 273(a). 
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AIA seem to recognize a public purpose for universities. Interestingly, 
such public purpose or commitment to pure research may also explain 
the carve-out for commercial use. It will be interesting to see how prior 
use is applied. Although, based on past experience in the United States 
and in Germany, the defense may never be actually raised. 
As a comparison, it is useful to consider the defense of state 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for copyright and patent 
infringement. Immunity for patent was the subject of a 1999 Supreme 
Court decision, which was applied to copyright infringement by lower 
courts.83 The rationale for immunity is based on the immunity of states 
for suits for damages in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. 
While the constitutional basis for state immunity rests in a questionable 
reading of the constitutional text, the Supreme Court has found state 
immunity in federal court to be broad and Congress’s ability to abrogate 
that immunity narrow.84 Consequently, state universities are immune 
from suit for damages arising from claims of copyright and patent 
infringement.85 
Immunity illustrates why state governments, and not solely state 
universities, are special for copyright and patent laws. State 
governments, arguably, engage in their own efforts at innovation. While 
they cannot enact legislation that conflicts with patent and copyright 
laws directly or on federal policy grounds, state legislatures can pursue 
innovation goals through other means, such as supporting start-up 
businesses or university research and development. University 
incubators, technology transfer offices, and research funding are 
examples of state initiatives targeting innovation.86 Furthermore, when 
the federal government limits its own support of research and 
development activities, as it did with funding of stem cell research 
during the Bush Administration, state governments can fill the gap if 
they choose. The primary instrument for states driving innovation is the 
83. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); 
Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 180 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
84. See e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
85. Florida Prepaid v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 627, 647-48; see also Gary Pulsinelli,
Freedom to Explore: Using the Eleventh Amendment to Liberate Researchers at State Universities 
from Liability for Intellectual Property Infringements, 82 WASH. L. REV. 275, 279 (2007). 
86. See generally Clovia Hamilton, University Technology Transfer and Economic
Development: Proposed Cooperative Economic Development Agreements Under the Bayh-Dole 
Act, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 397, 409-12 (2003); Kristen Osenga, Rembrandts in the Research 
Lab: Why Universities Should Take a Lesson from Big Business to Increase Innovation, 59 ME. L. 
REV. 407, 418-21 (2007). 
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university. Immunity from copyright and patent infringement allows 
state entities to incorporate and disseminate federally protected 
intellectual property in pursuit of their own technology 
commercialization efforts. 
State immunity, however, would not extend to private universities. 
Perhaps this reflects the view that private universities are often the 
instruments of federal research initiatives. But that explanation is less 
than satisfactory. Immunity for state universities may create incentives 
for joint ventures among private and public universities to pursue 
regional development efforts. Although we do not find extensive 
evidence for such ventures arising from the pursuit of immunity, the 
Court’s broad interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment might promote 
such ventures. More to the point, the different treatment of state and 
private universities could be seen as a boost to public universities who 
might better compete with private universities for commercialization 
projects. This policy justification is undermined by the availability of 
express waivers of immunity when a private company partners with a 
state university.87 Nonetheless, state universities acting unilaterally 
would find the immunity beneficial. 
C. Universities as Patent Enforcers 
While the AIA shelters universities as patent infringers, proposed 
legislation to regulate non-practicing entities protects universities as 
patent enforcers.88 Proposed patent reform seeks to punish entities that 
simply accumulate patent portfolios with no intent to commercialize or 
practice the patented technologies, but instead have the intent to initiate 
patent infringement suits that will result in settlements. Proposals for 
curbing these frivolous lawsuits include heightened pleading standards, 
automatically awarding attorney’s fees if the non-practicing entity loses 
the lawsuit, and requirements of specificity in both pleading and in any 
cease and desist letters sent prior to initiation of litigation.89 Advocates 
for universities have sought a carve-out for these proposed reforms on 
the theory that while universities may not commercialize patents, their 
intent in acquiring a patent portfolio is not to bring frivolous litigation.90 
The advocates’ implied argument is even stronger: that patent litigation 
87. See generally Robert G. Bone, From Property to Contract: The Eleventh Amendment and 
University-Private Sector Intellectual Property Relationships, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1467, 1489-97 
(2000). 
88. See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Congress (2015). 
89. See Innovation Act, H.R. 9. 
90. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 1, at 39-46. 
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brought by universities would almost certainly not be frivolous and 
pursued solely for settlement value. Consequently, patent reform would 
inappropriately characterize universities as patent trolls and unfairly 
increase their burden for protecting legitimate patent rights as compared 
to commercial patent owners. While the AIA creates a carve-out for 
universities by equating their use with commercial prior users, proposed 
carve-outs for universities seek to distinguish them from non-
commercial users pursuing frivolous litigation. 
In constructing the proposed carve-out, the goal is not to 
characterize universities as another class of commercial entity. Instead, 
the special status of universities is implicit, and the concern is that 
universities are unable to exercise their legitimate patent rights. The goal 
arguably is not to protect universities as the locus for pure research 
because the argument for exemption rests on the commercial interests of 
universities to create and own patent portfolios in order to generate a 
stream of licensing revenue. The second model for understanding 
universities is implicated in this argument. Commercialization is seen as 
a means to some unspecified end, rather than an end in itself. As a result, 
universities need special treatment to distinguish them from other patent 
holding entities that are not engaged in full-scale commercialization, but 
instead seek to monetize patents through licensing.91 
Our discussion of the treatment of universities under patent and 
copyright laws seems to have come full circle. With respect to patent 
ownership, universities do not obtain special treatment under the Bayh-
Dole and are subject to the same rules of assignment and transfer as 
other entities. But proposed debates over troll legislation recognize the 
special reasons why universities own patents. Therefore, university 
patent ownership requires special treatment in order that patent rights are 
not lost as universities seek unique ways of monetizing patents without 
engaging in full-scale commercial use of the patented technologies. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Universities are special for patent and copyright laws, at least in 
some limited ways. This paper, at a minimum, documents the ways in 
which the law carves out special rules for universities. However, more 
broadly, the paper shows how these special rules support policies unique 
to the role of universities in the innovation ecosystem within which they 
91. See Jeremiah S. Helm, Comment, Why Pharmaceutical Firms Support Patent Trolls: The
Disparate Impact of eBay v. MercExchange on Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
331, 335 (2006). 
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compete with for-profit entities whose purpose extends beyond pure 
research. An open question is whether existing special rules are adequate 
for protecting the interests of universities without balkanizing the federal 
policies regulating and promoting innovation. 
While the focus of this Article is on universities, the broader 
concern is understanding how intellectual property laws are tailored to 
various organizational contexts. This topic has not been adequately 
studied. There is a growing scholarly literature on transaction costs and 
intellectual property.92 But the interactions between organizational 
choice and intellectual property have not inspired as much research as 
they should. Whether to form a profit or non-profit, to organize as a 
partnership or a corporation, or to use contractors or employees are 
business choices that may well be driven by goals of intellectual 
property. This initial study of universities is a foray into the broader 
inquiry of intellectual property policy and business organizations. While 
intellectual property laws may be tailored to choices of business 
organizations, the case of universities shows how general rules can 
evolve to accommodate complex institutions with multiple goals that 
play a critical role in federal and state policies for invention, innovation, 
and development. 
92. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Transactional Costs and Antitrust Concerns in the Licensing 
of Intellectual Property, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 325 (2005). 
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